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INTRODUCTION 
A unique blend of kickboxing, boxing, judo, Brazilian jiu-jitsu, 
wrestling and a slew of other combat sports,1 mixed martial arts is 
quickly becoming one of the fastest-growing sports—if not the 
single fastest-growing sport—in the world.2  Frequent brutal 
knockouts3 and bone-breaking submission holds4 have garnered 
the sport vast fan support worldwide.5  In the last year alone, 
mixed martial arts has aired not only on pay-per-view platforms,6 
but has also been broadcasted on cable channels such as HDNet,7 
 
 1 Mixed Martial Arts, ATLANTA MARTIAL ARTS, http://www.atlantamartialarts.com/ 
styles/mma.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2011). 
 2 Andrew Sharp, Meeting MMA: An Outsider’s Encounter with the World’s Fastest 
Growing Sport, SB NATION (Feb. 10, 2010), http://www.sbnation.com/2010/2/10/ 
1300771/meeting-mma-outsiders-encounter. 
 3 12 Most Brutal MMA Knockouts, FIGHTERS.COM (Oct. 28, 2009), http://www. 
fighters.com/10/28/brutal-mma-ko-knockouts. 
 4 Matt Randall, Say Uncle: The Top 12 MMA Submissions of All Time, BLEACHER 
REP. (Sept. 8, 2009), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/250693-the-top-12-mma-
submissions-of-all-time. 
 5 Fedor’s Thrilling KO Seen by Over 25 Million Worldwide, FIGHT NETWORK (Nov. 
30, 2009, 9:50 AM), http://www.thefightnetwork.com/news/5371:fedors-thrilling-ko-
seen-by-over-25-million-worldwide. 
 6 UFC on DIRECTV Pay Per View, DIRECTV, http://www.directv.com/DTVAPP/ 
content/sports/ufc (last visited Sept. 30, 2010). 
 7 HDNet Fights, HDNET, http://www.hdnetfights.com/hdnetmmaschedule.php (last 
visited Sept. 30, 2010). 
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Spike TV,8 Versus,9 Showtime10 and MTV2.11  The sport has even 
hit national television, being broadcast in primetime on CBS.12  
Despite appearing on major television networks and in primetime 
timeslots, mixed martial arts has struggled to gain universal 
mainstream acceptance.13  Mixed martial arts has received more 
than its fair share of criticism,14 and has struggled to become legal 
in New York15—having only recently become legal in 
Massachusetts.16  In addition to its struggle to obtain legitimacy 
and mainstream acceptance, mixed martial arts—and particularly 
the leading mixed martial arts organization, the Ultimate Fighting 
Championship and its parent company Zuffa, LLC—faces a unique 
 
 8 Will Cooling, UFC 122 to be a Spike TV Special, INSIDE FIGHTS (Aug. 4, 2010), 
http://insidefights.com/2010/08/04/ufc-122-to-be-a-spike-tv-special. 
 9 UFC Live on Versus 2, UFC, http://www.ufc.com/media/UFC_Live_2 (last visited 
Sept. 30, 2010). 
 10 MMA Showtime Sports, SHOSPORTS, http://sports.sho.com/#/mma (last visited Feb. 
14, 2011).  
 11 MTV2 and Bellator Agree to 3-Year Partnership, BELLATOR (Dec. 14, 2010, 2:31 
PM), http://www.bellator.com/ViewArticle.dbml?DB_OEM_ID=23600&ATCLID= 
205054922; see Bellator 35 Debuts on MTV2 as Good, Hieron, Hawn, and Weedman 
Advance to Welterweight Semifinals, BELLATOR (Mar. 6, 2011, 8:18 AM), http:// 
www.bellator.com/ViewArticle.dbml?DB_OEM_ID=23600&ATCLID=205110124; 
John Morgan and Dan Stupp, Bellator 36 Debut Scores 230,000 Viewers; Replay Lands 
241,000, MMA JUNKIE (Mar. 15, 2011, 11:00 AM), http://mmajunkie. 
com/news/22838/bellator-36-debut-scores-230000-viewers-replay-lands-241000.mma. 
 12 D.S. Williamson, MMA Goes Primetime with Strikeforce on CBS, BETUS (Apr. 14, 
2010, 3:32 PM), http://www.betus.com/sports-betting/ufc/articles/mma-goes-prime-time-
with-strikeforce-s-and-cbs-s-seturday-broadcast-14-04-2010. 
 13 See Sharp, supra note 2. 
 14 See, e.g., Now Bob Reilly’s Just Trying to Piss Everybody Off, CAGE POTATO, http:// 
www.cagepotato.com/now-bob-reillys-just-trying-piss-everybody (last visited Oct. 2, 
2010) (New York State Assemblyman Bob Reilly, in a clip shown to mixed martial arts 
regulars UFC Commentator Joe Rogan, fighter Jason “Mayhem” Miller and owner of 
HDNet, one of the leading channels for mixed martial arts coverage, Mark Cuban, 
compared making money from mixed martial arts to making money from dog fighting 
and prostitution). 
 15 N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 8905(a)(2) (McKinney 1997).  As of today, mixed martial 
arts is currently illegal in the state of New York. See States for Kickboxing or MMA, 
INT’L KICKBOXING FED’N, http://www.ikfkickboxing.com/USAStates.htm (last visited 
Oct. 2, 2010).  
 16 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 147, § 32 (West 2010); see Brett Okamoto, 
Massachusetts Becomes 42nd State to Regulate MMA, LAS VEGAS SUN, Nov. 30, 2009, 
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2009/nov/30/massachusetts-becomes-42nd-state-
regulate-mma. 
C05_BLACK_20110425 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2011  6:42 PM 
742 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 21:739 
and increasingly complex problem in protecting its intellectual 
property, both domestically and internationally, over the Internet. 
This Note assesses the recent enforcement of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) to predict whether Zuffa 
will succeed in copyright infringement complaints against various 
websites that have hosted content that Zuffa claims infringes its 
copyrights.  It then argues that the failure of the DMCA to protect 
copyrighted works, as well as the DMCA’s failure to ease the 
burden for copyright holders in policing copyright infringement on 
the Internet, has created a dire need to reassess the archaic 
language of the DMCA.  This assessment is especially urgent to 
preventing illegal live streams, Zuffa’s biggest enemy.  Because it 
relies so heavily on proceeds from viewers paying for live video, 
protecting its live video streams from piracy is of paramount 
importance to Zuffa.  This Note concludes that service providers 
and copyright owners need to increase communication with one 
another, especially when the service provider is able to, and 
actually does, provide live, or nearly live content.  Lastly, it 
supports a legislative scheme that holds websites liable for 
monetary, equitable and other relief when the websites provide or 
host illegal live streams, so long as the websites have some 
knowledge, whether constructive or actual, of the infringing 
content. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Zuffa, LLC and the Pay-Per-View Business 
Zuffa, LLC is the parent company of the Ultimate Fighting 
Championship (“UFC”), the world’s largest mixed martial arts 
organization.17  In 2010, the UFC put on twenty-four separate 
events on pay-per-view and live television.18  In the prior year, 
approximately 8 million people purchased pay-per-views from the 
 
 17 See Nick Caron, Todd Duffee: UFC Buying Strikeforce will Help MMA Gain 
Respect, BLEACHER REP. (Mar. 15, 2011), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/636602-todd-
duffee-ufc-buying-strikeforce-will-help-mma-gain-respect. 
 18 Past Events, UFC, http://uk.ufc.com/event/Past_Events?year=2010 (last visited Jan. 
25, 2010).  
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UFC19 over the course of thirteen events at approximately $44.95 
per purchase.20  Zuffa recently merged its “World Extreme 
Cagefighting” (“WEC”) with the UFC, making the UFC, under the 
banner of Zuffa, the biggest and arguably the most important 
mixed martial arts organization in the world.21  Additionally, Zuffa 
recently purchased its closest rival, Strikeforce MMA.22  Zuffa is 
unquestionably the biggest player in mixed martial arts today. 
Zuffa’s foray into the pay-per-view market has been quite 
lucrative, skyrocketing the company’s worth to $2.5 billion, up 
from the $2 million that Zuffa paid for UFC only ten years ago.23  
At approximately 8 million buys at $44.95 per buy,24 the UFC 
earned Zuffa about $359.6 million in pay-per-view purchases alone 
last year.25  This figure does not include sponsorships, nor does it 
include commercial advertising on free cards26 presented on 
national television.27  Despite Zuffa’s handsome pay-per-view 
 
 19 Dave Meltzer, UFC Remains King of PPV Hill, YAHOO!SPORTS (Feb. 15, 2010, 4:33 
PM), http://sports.yahoo.com/mma/news?slug=dm-ppvbiz021510. Pay-per-view is a 
service provided by cable or satellite television providers charging viewers a fee (on top 
of monthly subscription fees for the cable or satellite subscription) to watch special 
events. See What is Pay-Per-View Television?, BUSINESSDICTIONARY.COM, http://www. 
businessdictionary.com/definition/pay-per-view-PPV-television.html (last visited Apr. 3, 
2011). 
 20 Steve Barry, UFC Files Lawsuit Against Site Selling Unathorized [sic] Pay-Per-
View Streams, MMA CONVERT (Feb. 19, 2010), http://www.mmaconvert.com/ 
2010/02/19/ufc-files-lawsuit-against-site-selling-unathorized-pay-per-view-streams. 
 21 See Mike Whitman, UFC, WEC to Merge in 2011, SHERDOG (Oct. 28, 2010), 
http://www.sherdog.com/news/news/UFC-WEC-to-Merge-in-2011-27812. 
 22 Ariel Helwani, Zuffa Purchases Strikeforce, MMA FIGHTING (Mar. 12, 2011, 1:13 
PM), http://www.mmafighting.com/2011/03/12/zuffa-purchases-strikeforce. 
 23 How Much is the UFC Worth?, MMAMANIA.COM (Sept. 23, 2010, 11:47 PM), 
http://www.mmamania.com/2010/9/23/1707472/how-much-is-the-ufc-worth. 
 24 A “buy” is the term for purchasing a pay-per-view. See InDemand Pay Per View, 
BUCKEYE CABLE SYS., http://www.buckeyecablesystem.com/payperview/index.html (last 
visited Jan. 25, 2010). 
25 This number is an estimate based on the eight million buys multiplied by $44.95 per 
buy. 
 26 A “card” is the set of fights scheduled to be put on at any one particular event. See 
Eric Cohen, Card, ABOUT.COM, http://prowrestling.about.com/od/wrestlingterminology/ 
g/glocard.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2010). 
 27 See, e.g., Cooling, supra note 8; Ray Hui, UFC 120 to Air Free on Spike TV, 
MMAFIGHTING.COM  (July 29, 2010, 11:04 AM), http://www.mmafighting.com/ 
2010/07/29/ufc-120-to-air-free-on-spike-tv; Mari Shapiro, TUF 11 Finale Preview: 
Undercard, SPIKE TV (June 17, 2010), http://www.spike.com/blog/tuf-11-finale/96748; 
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revenues, its profits have been put in a guillotine choke28 by those 
streaming Zuffa’s pay-per-view fights live over the Internet for 
free.29 
As the world’s largest pay-per-view vendor,30 Zuffa will likely 
be at the forefront of pay-per-view legislation and litigation in 
today’s Internet-heavy world.31  In response to increasing piracy of 
their pay-per-view events, Zuffa and the UFC filed suit against 
streaming websites such as Justin.TV, UStream.TV and Rage-
Streams.net.32  While Zuffa has set its sights on taking down illegal 
and infringing streams of its pay-per-views, its efforts to date have 
been of little or no avail; Zuffa finds that the more illegal streams it 
successfully orders taken down, the more illegal streams are 
uploaded to replace them.33 
Zuffa faces a unique problem that has remained unaddressed 
by the current copyright regime.  Much of Zuffa’s revenue stream 
 
Brendhan Conlon, UFC on Versus 2—Previews and Predictions, FIVE OUNCES OF PAIN 
(July 31, 2010, 6:46 PM), http://fiveouncesofpain.com/2010/07/31/ufc-on-versus-2-
previews-and-predictions.  All of these cards aired or will air for free on cable television 
and did not require a special pay-per-view purchase to be viewed by the public. See 
Fighter Salaries for UFC Fight Night 6, MMA WEEKLY (Aug. 28, 2006), http:// 
mmaweekly.com/fighter-salaries-for-ufc-fight-night-6. 
28  A guillotine choke is a common chokehold in mixed martial arts used to cut off 
either air or blood flow to the head. Learn the Guillotine Choke for Mixed Martial Arts, 
MMA-TRAINING.COM (Aug. 2, 2007), http://www.mma-training.com/guillotine-choke. 
 29 Darren Rovell, Sports Organizations Fighting Live Streaming Piracy, CNBC (Dec. 
16, 2009), http://www.cnbc.com/id/34450541/Sports_Organizations_Fighting_Live_ 
Streaming_Piracy. 
 30 Dann Stupp, UFC Continues Anti-piracy Campaign, Subpoenas Justin.tv and 
Ustream.tv, MMA JUNKIE (July 23, 2010, 4:35 PM), http://mmajunkie.com/news/ 
20035/ufc-continues-anti-piracy-campaign-subpoenas-justin-tv-and-ustream-tv.mma. 
 31 UFC President Dana White has made his intentions clear about using the Internet to 
his full advantage to expand the UFC into all global markets. See Dann Stupp, UFC 
President Dana White Expects Web to Serve as Global UFC Television Channel, MMA 
JUNKIE (Mar. 29, 2010, 3:15 PM), http://mmajunkie.com/news/18498/ufc-president-dana-
white-expects-web-to-serve-as-global-ufc-television-channel.mma. 
 32 Stupp, supra note 30; Kevin Iole, Zuffa Sues for Infringement, YAHOO!SPORTS (Feb. 
20, 2010), http://sports.yahoo.com/mma/news?slug=ki-zuffasues021910. 
 33 See Steven Marrocco, After Latest Action, UFC Counsel Hopeful for “Decided 
Downturn” in Illegal PPV Streaming, MMA JUNKIE (Feb. 19, 2010, 7:40 PM), 
http://mmajunkie.com/news/18013/ufc-counsel-hopeful-for-decided-downturn-in-illegal-
pay-per-view-streaming.mma. 
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is based on pay-per-view sales,34 as UFC gate receipts35 sometimes 
do not even cover the fighter payrolls.36  These pay-per-view 
events are broadcast live on television and via “streaming video” 
over the Internet.  “Streaming” is the ability to watch or listen to a 
video or a radio station while “progressive[ly] download[ing]” the 
video and sound, without making a copy of it on the recipient’s 
computer.37  However, anyone with a laptop and a webcam can 
broadcast streaming video in addition to receiving it.  Websites 
such as Justin.TV provide users the ability to broadcast live video 
off of their own computer screens.38  As a result, it is fairly easy 
for someone to pay Zuffa to watch a fight and then to illegally 
stream the fight on Justin.TV.39   
One user this past year uploaded illegal streams of two UFC 
pay-per-views and drew a total of 114,000 non-paying viewers for 
the two events.40  While this is just one example, UFC executives 
have alleged there were over 160,000 illegal streams of one of its 
events, drawing countless numbers of illegal viewers.41  Using 
these numbers as a guide, it can be estimated that Zuffa could 
potentially lose as much as $409,944,000 per event because of 
unauthorized streams.42  UFC President Dana White has stated that 
 
 34 Dave Meltzer, Another Record Year for UFC on PPV, YAHOO!SPORTS (Jan. 11, 
2011, 10:18 AM), http://sports.yahoo.com/mma/news?slug=dm-ppvbiz011111. 
 35 “Gate receipts” refers to the amount of money made by selling tickets to a live 
event. See Gate Receipts, ALLWORDS.COM, http://www.allwords.com/word-
gate+receipts.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2010). 
 36 See, e.g., Nat Detroit, Fighter Paydays, Bonuses and Gate Receipts from UFC on 
Versus, SQUABBLES (Mar. 27, 2010), http://www.squabbles.com/2010/03/fighter-
paydays-bonuses-and-gate-receipts-from-ufc-on-versus. 
 37 Sam Costello, What is Streaming?, ABOUT.COM, http://ipod.about.com/od/ 
glossary/g/streaming_def.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2011). 
 38 Share Your Desktop, JUSTIN.TV, http://www.justin.tv/broadcast/adv_desktop (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2011). 
39  Additionally, some customers plug their cable or satellite receivers into their home 
computers and upload the video live onto the Internet that way. See How to Connect 
Cable Television to a Computer Monitor, VIDEOJUG (Dec. 15, 2008), http://www. 
videojug.com/article/how-to-connect-cable-television-to-a-computer-monitor-2. 
 40 See Stupp, supra note 30. 
 41 See Rovell, supra note 29. 
 42 Last year, a single unauthorized stream drew a combined total of 114,000 viewers 
over two UFC events, averaging 57,000 unauthorized viewers per event. See Stupp, supra 
note 30.  A 2009 UFC event appeared on over 160,000 such illegal streams. See Rovell, 
supra note 29.  Assuming that these numbers are typical, multiplying them together 
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“[t]he criminal theft of pay-per-views has resulted in the loss of 
millions of dollars of revenue to not only the UFC and its fighters, 
but has also deprived federal, state and local government of their 
rightful entitlement to significant tax revenue.”43   
B. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
Copyright law provides protection for original works of 
authorship “fixed in a tangible medium of expression.”44  
Audiovisual works are considered works of authorship.45  Though 
live television is not technically “fixed” in a tangible medium—
because the event is happening in that moment and thus cannot 
technically be “fixed” at the time of broadcast—copyright law 
allows for a work to be considered “fixed” if there is fixation 
simultaneous with transmission.46  Therefore, because Zuffa 
produces a live audiovisual product that is simultaneously fixed 
upon transmission, Zuffa’s fights and pay-per-view production are 
protected under copyright law. 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”)47 was 
passed in 1998 to strike a critical balance between the rights and 
interests of copyright holders and the protection of Internet service 
providers (“ISPs”), and to enable copyright law to keep pace with 
the expansion of the Internet.48  For purposes of the DMCA, an 
Internet service provider (also called an Online Service Provider) 
is defined as “a provider of online services . . . including an entity 
offering the transmission, routing or providing of connections for 
 
yields a potential audience of 9,120,000 non-paying viewers for any given UFC event.  
Assuming further that each of these viewers would have paid full price ($44.95) to watch 
the event had it not been available for free, Zuffa loses approximately $409 million per 
event.  While this is a rough estimate, it is nevertheless a staggering one.   
 43 John Morgan, White Says Future is Here with UFC.tv, Online Pirates Should Prep 
for Jail Time, MMA JUNKIE (Feb. 9, 2011, 9:50 AM), http://mmajunkie.com/news/ 
22397/white-says-future-is-here-with-ufc-tv-online-pirates-should-prep-for-jail-time. 
mma. 
 44 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
 45 Id. § 102(a)(6). 
 46 Id. § 101. 
 47 Id. § 512. 
 48 Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(quoting S. Rep. No. 105-190 (1998)). 
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digital online communications.”49  Congress, in passing the 
DMCA, was concerned with fostering technological innovation 
and expanding the Internet while protecting the rights of copyright 
holders.50  This critical balance between fostering innovation and 
protecting copyright holders animates the DMCA and drives much 
of DMCA-related litigation today.51 
Under the DMCA, a copyright holder has the ability to inform 
a service provider of any infringing content that appears on that 
service provider’s website, by issuing a “takedown notice.”52  The 
DMCA requires that a takedown notice contain the copyright 
holder’s physical or electronic signature, the exact location of the 
infringing work, the work it allegedly infringes, and a statement 
that the copyright holder has a reasonable belief that the allegedly 
infringing work is actually infringing.53 
Fair use is an affirmative defense to copyright infringement.54  
In assessing whether a particular item on a website is infringing, 
the copyright owner must evaluate whether the allegedly infringing 
work constitutes a fair use of the source material.55  A mixed 
question of law and fact, fair use relies on analyzing four factors: 
(1) the purpose and character of the allegedly infringing use 
(educational and non-profit uses are more likely to be fair use than 
commercial uses); (2) the nature of the copyrighted work (works 
that are original are more likely to be infringed than works that are 
factual compilations or the like); (3) the amount and substantiality 
of the portion used (assessing both how much of the plaintiff’s 
work was used in the defendant’s infringing work as well as how 
much of the defendant’s infringing work is made up of the 
plaintiff’s protectable work); and (4) the effect of the defendant’s 
infringing use on the market for the plaintiff’s goods (evaluating 
 
49  Online Service Providers, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/ 
onlinesp (last visited Apr. 3, 2011). 
 50 Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 519. 
 51 See generally id. 
 52 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3). 
 53 Id. 
 54 4-13 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 
(Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2010). 
 55 Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1154–55 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
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whether the infringing work operates as a replacement for the 
plaintiff’s work).56 
Determinations of fair use require an in-depth assessment of 
the work by a human being because they require an assessment of 
whether the infringing work took the “heart” and “soul” of the 
original piece.57  Under the DMCA, then, the onus of policing the 
Internet for violations of any particular copyright falls squarely on 
the copyright owner; the owner of a copyright exclusively 
possesses critical knowledge and information enabling him or her 
to more efficiently and accurately assess whether or not any 
particular content is infringing.58  Once an ISP obtains a 
substantially compliant takedown notice pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 
512(c)(3), the website must work expeditiously to either remove or 
block the infringing content.59 
In exchange for the ISP’s compliance with this task, the statute 
provides a “safe harbor” freeing it from liability for monetary, 
injunctive or equitable relief if sued by the owner of the copyright 
for contributory or vicarious copyright infringement.60  In order to 
be protected under the safe harbor, the service provider must not 
have actual knowledge that its hosted content is infringing, nor can 
the service provider be aware of facts or circumstances from which 
infringement would be apparent.61  Furthermore, if the service 
provider is aware that it is hosting infringing content (i.e., if it has 
“actual knowledge” of infringement) the service provider must act 
expeditiously, on its own, to remove or disable the infringing 
content.62  Additionally, if the ISP has the ability to control 
infringing content on a hosted website, it cannot receive a direct 
 
 56 17 U.S.C. § 107; see also Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1154–55. 
 57 Michael S. Sawyer, Note, Filters, Fair-Use & Feedback: User-Generated Content 
Principles and the DMCA, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 368, 388–90 (2009). 
 58 Greg Jansen, Note, Whose Burden is it Anyway? Addressing the Needs of Content 
Owners in DMCA Safe Harbors, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 153, 172–73 (Jan. 2010).  
Interestingly, because courts require a copyright holder to assess fair use before issuing a 
takedown notice, the DMCA demands that potential plaintiffs themselves assess the 
validity of a potential defendant’s defense to infringement. 
 59 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C). 
 60 Id. § 512(c)(1). 
 61 Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). 
 62 Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii). 
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financial benefit from the existence of such infringing content.63  
The service provider must also institute a system for terminating 
repeat infringers, and must adopt and not interfere with “standard 
technical measures” used by copyright owners to police the service 
provider’s website.64  A “standard technical measure” might be a 
“watermark”65 or other technological means to prevent copying.66  
These “standard technical measures” are only required to the 
extent that they do not impose a substantial financial burden upon 
the service provider.67 
1.  The “Red Flag” Test 
Of critical importance, and of some measure of debate, is the 
question of when a service provider is aware of facts or 
circumstances making infringement “apparent.”68  Congress, upon 
passing the DMCA, called the test for whether or not a service 
provider is “aware of facts or circumstances making infringement 
apparent” a “red flag” test.69  The question, as stated by the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, should be whether a reasonable person, in 
the same or similar circumstances, would find that there was 
infringing activity.70 
The “red flag” test has proven difficult to overcome for content 
owners.  For example, in Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC,71 plaintiff 
Perfect 10, a publisher of adult magazines and websites, sued 
another website for posting photographs copied from the plaintiff’s 
 
 63 Id. § 512(c)(1)(B). 
 64 Id. § 512(i)(1). 
65  A watermark is digital information inserted into a file in order to identify the source 
of the file.  Watermarks are frequently used to digitally protect copyrights. Digital 
Watermark, WEBOPEDIA, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/D/digital_watermark.html 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2011). 
 66 Public Law 105-304: Digital Millenium Copyright Act, UNIV. OF CINCINNATI INTELL. 
PROP. OFFICE, http://www.ipo.uc.edu/index.cfm?fuseaction=policies.dmca (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2011). 
 67 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2)(C). 
 68 Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii). 
 69 Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 519–20 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, at 53–54 (1998); S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 44–45 
(1998)). 
 70 Id. at 520. 
 71 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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magazines and websites.72  Despite Congress’s determination that 
site names that included the words “pirate” and “bootleg”73 
constituted “red flags,” the Ninth Circuit found that CCBill’s links 
to sites called “illegal.net” and “stolencelebritypics.com” did not 
constitute red flags of infringement.74  The Ninth Circuit reasoned 
that because the nature of the images was pornographic, the use of 
words like “illegal” and “stolen” in the names of several sites 
hosted by CCBill may simply have been an attempt to boost the 
pictures’ appeal to the targeted audience, and enhance their 
salacious appeal.75 
Perfect10 has been read to hold that “if investigation of ‘facts 
and circumstances’ is required to identify material as infringing, 
then those facts and circumstances are not ‘red flags.’”76  It is 
unclear, then, how the standard of “actual knowledge” differs from 
the “constructive knowledge” standard articulated in separate 
sections of the DMCA77 after Perfect 10.  If, in order for a service 
provider to have seen “red flags” of infringement, the service 
provider must not have been required to conduct any investigation 
in order to determine that the hosted content was infringing, it 
becomes unclear how the “red flag” standard differs in any 
discernible way from an actual knowledge standard of 
infringement. 
In fact, some courts and commentators have run counter to 
Congress’s specified intent, stating that the standard “is not what a 
reasonable person would have deduced given all the 
 
 72 See generally id. 
 73 Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 522 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, at 57–58 (1998); 
S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 48–49 (1998)). 
 74 Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1114 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 75 Id. 
 76 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1108 (C.D. 
Cal. 2009); see also id. (“The question is not ‘what a reasonable person would have 
deduced given all the circumstances.’ . . . Instead, the question is ‘whether the service 
provider deliberately proceeded in the face of blatant factors of which it was aware.’” 
(citation omitted)). 
77 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (2006).  Notice that there is one clause for 
“actual knowledge” and one clause for “facts or circumstances from which infringing 
activity is apparent.”  Congress clearly intended to draw a distinction between these two 
standards: a distinction that has become nearly non-existent. 
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circumstances.”78  This skewed reading of the statute assumes that 
Congress intended to shield from infringement liability any service 
provider that reasonably deduces from the circumstances that it is 
hosting infringing material.  These courts and commentators read 
the word “apparent” to mean that the infringement must be so 
obvious that if any deduction, however slight, or if any 
investigation, however trivial, was necessary to conclude that the 
content was infringing, then the facts and circumstances that lead 
to the investigation were not red flags of infringement.79  This 
reading collapses the “knowledge of facts and circumstances” 
standard articulated in § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) of the DMCA into the 
“actual knowledge” standard articulated in § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) of the 
statute, a result Congress clearly could not have intended.  Indeed, 
failure under either standard should remove a service provider 
from safe harbor protection, because the “knowledge of facts and 
circumstances” standard expressly applies “in the absence of . . . 
actual knowledge.”80  Congress could not have meant for both 
standards to be essentially the same.  Moreover, this construction 
of the statute places the burden of policing copyright infringement 
even more squarely on the shoulders of owners of the copyright.81 
2. “Direct Financial Benefit” from and the “Right and Ability 
to Control” Content 
Also unclear from the text of the statute is the intended 
interpretation of § 512(c)(1)(B) of the DMCA, which provides that 
in order to be eligible for the safe harbor, service providers must 
not “receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the 
 
 78 Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1108 (W.D. Wash. 2004) 
(quoting 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
12B.04[A][1], at 12B-49 (Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2010)); cf. H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, at 
57–58 (1998) (“[I]f the service provider becomes aware of a “red flag” from which 
infringing activity is apparent, it will lose the limitation of liability if it takes no action.”); 
S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 48–49 (1998). 
 79 UMG Recordings, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1108 (“[I]f investigation of ‘facts and 
circumstances’ is required to identify material as infringing, then those facts and 
circumstances are not ‘red flags.’”). 
80  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 81 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that 
the DMCA places the burden of policing copyright infringement on the owners of the 
copyright). 
C05_BLACK_20110425 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2011  6:42 PM 
752 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 21:739 
infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the 
right and ability to control such activity.”82 There is some 
confusion specifically as to the meaning of the terms “financial 
benefit directly attributable” and “right and ability to control” the 
content.83 
If a service provider obtains a direct financial benefit from 
infringing content that the service provider has the “right and 
ability to control,” the service provider loses the safe harbor.84  The 
Ninth Circuit has implied that a website’s use of infringing 
material to build or expand its user base would be considered a 
“financial benefit directly attributable to” the infringing content.85  
When a business attracts fees from subscribers using infringing 
materials as bait, it has been said that the service provider is 
attaining a direct financial benefit.86 
Even if direct financial benefit is proven, the service provider 
retains the protection of the DMCA’s safe harbor unless it also has 
the right and ability to control the content.87  Having the “right and 
ability to control” the content requires more than the mere practical 
ability to take down content, but the ability to locate specifically 
infringing content at will.88  For example, the Northern District of 
California has held that a video sharing service lacked the practical 
ability to control infringing content on its site where the names of 
the videos at issue may have been misleading.89 
In light of the above, the DMCA appears to provide a high 
standard of protection for Internet service providers while placing 
a heavy burden upon copyright owners.  It appears, then, that while 
Zuffa may be able to attack end-users of the content, and perhaps 
even individual uploaders, sites like Justin.TV, UStream.TV and 
 
 82 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B). 
 83 See id. 
 84 Id.  
 85 See Sawyer, supra note 57, at 372–73. 
 86 Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting A&M Records, 
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
 87 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B); Sawyer, supra note 57, at 374. 
 88 See Sawyer, supra note 57, at 374–75. 
 89 See Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 
2008). 
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Rage-Streams.net might be free from any sort of copyright 
liability.   
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A. The Viacom v. YouTube Decision 
Several recent cases have addressed an Internet service 
provider’s liability under the DMCA when copyright violations 
were rampant on the service provider’s website.  In 2007, media 
conglomerate Viacom International brought suit against Internet 
service provider YouTube.90  YouTube is the world’s most popular 
video community, with over two billion videos viewed per day and 
approximately twenty-four hours worth of video uploaded to the 
website every minute.91  Viacom92 claimed that YouTube was not 
subject to the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions93 because it had 
actual knowledge and was aware of facts and circumstances that 
would make infringement apparent.94  Zuffa, in fact, joined the 
proceedings filing an amicus brief on behalf of Viacom, urging the 
court to take a narrower view of the DMCA safe harbor 
provisions.95  Zuffa urged the court to find YouTube, and other 
service providers, to be outside of the safe harbor if they 
intentionally and knowingly provided copyright infringement 
capabilities.96  Ultimately, Zuffa and Viacom failed in their efforts 
as the court held that YouTube was subject to the safe harbor 
provision because it did not have the requisite level of knowledge, 
did not have control over the videos at issue, and had acted 
 
90 Viacom v. YouTube, BENEDICT.COM, http://www.benedict.com/Digital/Internet/ 
YouTube/YouTube.aspx (last visited Apr. 3, 2011). 
 91 YouTube Fact Sheet, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/fact_sheet (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2010). 
 92 For information on Viacom and the Viacom networks, see Viacom’s website: 
http://www.viacom.com. 
 93 Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 94 Id.  
 95 Justin Klein, Zuffa’s Piracy Fight—Winning the Battle, But Can it Win the War?, 
MMA PAYOUT (Nov. 10, 2010), http://mmapayout.com/2010/11/zuffa%E2%80%99s-
piracy-fight%E2%80%93-winning-the-battle-but-can-it-win-the-war. 
 96 See id. 
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expeditiously to remove the videos once it knew the videos were 
infringing.97 
The court framed the question in Viacom as whether the 
language of the DMCA safe harbor relating to “actual knowledge” 
and “knowledge of circumstances from which infringement is 
apparent” was to be read as a general awareness of infringing 
activity or as requiring actual or constructive knowledge of 
specific and identifiable infringement of particular copyrights.98  
The court emphasized that YouTube had a day’s worth of content 
uploaded to its site every minute99 and noted that the infringing 
content on the website may represent only a tiny fraction of what is 
actually uploaded to the website.100  In light of these facts, the 
court found that YouTube had no duty to police and monitor its 
website, reasoning that the website cannot easily tell whether the 
use is authorized by the provider, or whether the infringing use is a 
fair use.101  In other words, millions of users could be posting the 
same exact work many millions of times over.  In theory, it is very 
difficult for a website to determine which of these millions of 
postings are licensed, which are infringing and which are fair uses. 
The court went on to find that so long as YouTube took down 
any allegedly infringing video when it received a takedown notice, 
it was protected from liability by the DMCA safe harbor 
provisions.102  The court rejected Viacom’s argument that once a 
takedown notice was provided to YouTube, YouTube was under a 
further obligation to look for additional similar infringement.103  
Indeed, the court was satisfied that the DMCA safe harbor 
protections and the notice-and-takedown procedures were 
sufficient to protect Viacom, noting that within one business day of 
sending 100,000 notices, YouTube had taken down most of the 
videos in question.104   
 
 97 See id.; see also Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 514. 
 98 See Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 519. 
 99 Id. at 518. 
 100 Id. at 524. 
 101 Id. at 523–24.  
 102 Id. at 526–27. 
 103 See id. at 528–29. 
 104 Id. at 523–24. 
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The court also acknowledged that YouTube employed other 
measures to protect copyright owners, which entitled it to the safe 
harbor protections.  YouTube blocks repeat offenders via a “three-
strikes” system.  A user who receives either (1) a DMCA notice 
against him or her for multiple videos or (2) multiple DMCA 
takedown requests against him or her within two hours receives a 
“strike”; YouTube blocks users with three strikes from uploading 
more content.105  The court was not confronted with the question of 
how to deal with users who receive a single takedown notice for a 
single video, or those who receive a takedown notice every two-
hours-and-one-minute multiple times a day.  It is also unclear from 
the court’s holding whether YouTube must block a particular IP 
address106 from posting again, or whether it can simply block the 
individual’s user name to remain eligible for the safe harbor.  If a 
website must block only a username, any potential pirate can 
simply create a new username with new information and resume 
streaming and uploading infringing content within minutes.  
YouTube also provides a “claim your content” system, whereby 
copyright owners can submit their content to the site preemptively.  
YouTube then checks its uploaded content against these 
“fingerprints” submitted by the content’s owner.107  If the content 
matches the submitted sample, it is automatically removed from 
the website.108  However, YouTube does not consider infringing 
content that is taken down under the “fingerprint” system as a 
“strike” under its “three-strikes” system.109 
The court also applied quite stringent criteria in determining 
whether YouTube received a direct financial benefit from the 
infringing content on its site.110  The court acknowledged that there 
could be an argument made that YouTube benefits from the 
advertising revenue it generates while hosting infringing content 
 
 105 Id. at 527–28. 
 106 An IP address is a unique user-identification number that is automatically assigned 
to the user.  There are two types of IP addresses, dynamic and static. R. Kayne, What is a 
Static IP Address, WISEGEEK, http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-a-static-ip-address.htm 
(last visited Oct. 9, 2010). 
 107 Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 528. 
 108 Id.  
 109 See id. 
 110 Id. at 527. 
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on the site, thus collecting revenues that “are ‘directly attributable 
to’ infringements.”111  However, the court stated that the website 
owner must know of the particular infringement in order to be 
receiving a direct financial benefit from it.112  The Viacom decision 
thus strongly favors service providers and cuts largely against 
copyright owners. 
Ultimately, Viacom stands for the proposition that a service 
provider’s knowledge of a particular type of infringement of a 
particular work does not constitute constructive knowledge of 
infringement sufficient to require a service provider to investigate 
further instances of similar (or the same) infringement.113 
B. Justin.TV and UStream.TV 
Justin.TV is a host of live streaming video.114  It advertises that 
users can show the world what they are doing using only a webcam 
at all times of the day.115  UStream.TV presents itself similarly.116  
Zuffa has filed a copyright infringement suit against Justin.TV,117 
and also has subpoenaed Justin.TV and UStream.TV for the IP 
addresses of individuals who have uploaded streams of its pay-per-
views.118   
The goal of Zuffa’s subpoenas, according to UFC President 
Dana White, is to put people in jail for their illegal viewing of the 
pay-per-views,119 which he hopes will put a stop to the illegal 
 
 111 Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (2006)). 
 112 Id. 
 113 See id. 
 114 About Us—Justin.tv, JUSTIN.TV, http://www.justin.tv/p/about_us (last visited Oct. 9, 
2010). 
 115 Id. 
 116 See About Us, USTREAM.TV, http://www.ustream.tv/about (last visited Oct. 9, 
2010). 
117  Pirates Beware! Zuffa Files Lawsuit Against Justin.tv for Alleged Illegal UFC Video 
Uploading, MMAWEEKLY.COM (Jan. 21, 2011), http://mmaweekly.com/pirates-beware-
zuffa-files-lawsuit-against-justin-tv-for-alleged-illegal-ufc-video-uploading [hereinafter 
Pirates Beware!]. 
 118 Stupp, supra note 30; see also Complaint, Zuffa, LLC v. Justin.tv, Inc., 2:2011 cv 
00114 (D. Nev. 2011). 
119 This suit is similar to the suit filed by the producers of The Hurt Locker, who sued 
some 5,000 John Does for downloading illegal copies of the movie. See As Hurt Locker 
Producers Sue Thousands for File Sharing . . . They Claim Free Speech Rights to Copy 
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viewing altogether.120  White threw the proverbial hammer down 
on those illegally viewing the content, stating: “I can’t wait to go 
after thieves who are stealing our content.  This is a fight we will 
not lose.”121  White said that pirates “are going to jail.”122 
Apart from advancing Zuffa’s campaign to appear steadfast 
and determined in at least taking a stand against piracy, mass 
litigation likely will not be helpful in putting a stop to illegal 
downloading, uploading and streaming, if the experience of the 
recording industry serves as any indication.123  Between 2003 and 
2008, the Recording Industry of America (“RIAA”) launched 
35,000 suits against illegal downloaders.124  However, the RIAA 
abandoned a majority of its litigation against individual users to 
partner with Internet service providers in order to cut Internet 
access to users who repeatedly uploaded and shared videos in 
violation of copyright.125  Even Zuffa’s counsel admits that in the 
face of sending out a bevy of takedown notices and threatening 
litigation, Zuffa is seeing more and more illegal streams of its pay-
per-views across the Internet.126  It is not entirely clear whether 
mass litigation against pirates will have a significant effect on the 
rate of piracy. 
Even if Zuffa elects to conduct mass litigation against viewers 
of illegal streams, it is not clear that such litigation will be 
successful.  In a recent case decided by the Second Circuit, the 
court ruled that streaming content did not constitute copyright 
infringement because there was no fixation in a tangible medium 
of expression.127  That is, the buffering of the video that was 
occurring and streaming live was fixed for only a transitory 
 
Story of Soldier, TECHDIRT, http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100614/1841189815. 
shtml. 
 120 Stupp, supra note 30. 
 121 Id. 
 122 See Morgan, supra note 43. 
 123 See Sarah McBride and Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL 
ST. J. TECH BLOG (Dec. 19, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB122966038836021137.html. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 See Marrocco, supra note 33.  
 127 Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 129–30 (2d Cir. 
2008). 
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duration—literally second-to-second—and could not constitute 
fixation sufficient to be declared making a “copy.”128  The court 
did admit, however, that the fixation inquiry must be “fact-
specific,” and did not seek to make a general ruling as to whether 
buffering and streaming video necessarily involves copying.129  
The court thus articulated a murky standard—or perhaps no 
standard at all—as to whether the buffering of streaming video in 
RAM can ever constitute the making of a “copy.”  Still, if this case 
is any indication, Zuffa could face an uphill battle in attacking at 
least the end-users watching the streams, despite having settled 500 
cases with defendants accused of streaming their pay-per-views.130  
Importantly, however, while it is likely that buffering video in 
RAM might not be found to constitute copying, if a court found 
that it did, such copying would likely fail a fair use analysis 
because most streams provide a viable replacement for the pay-
per-views themselves and the infringing content consists entirely 
of the copyrightable material.131 
Against this backdrop, Zuffa recently filed suit against 
Justin.TV for violations under the DMCA.132  Zuffa alleges that 
despite its consistent efforts to work with Justin.TV to prevent 
piracy, Justin.TV has persistently turned a blind eye to the 
problem.133  In addition, Zuffa claims that Justin.TV has induced 
copyright violations on its website.134  Zuffa will almost certainly 
 
 128 See generally id. at 130.  
 129 See id.  
 130 See Stupp, supra note 30. 
 131 Justin Klein, My Analysis Re Liability for Viewing an Illegally Streamed Event, 
FIGHT LAWYER BLOG (Aug. 6, 2010, 2:47 PM), http://www.fightlawyerblog.com/ 
2010/08/my-analysis-of-liability-for-viewing.html.  It should be noted that Klein posits, 
and Zuffa has stated, that illegally viewing a stream could subject the viewer to liability 
under the Federal Communications Act for illegally intercepting cable television 
broadcasts.  This argument is focused on end-user liability as opposed to Internet service 
provider liability and as such is beyond the scope of this Note.  It is possible that Zuffa 
could achieve some recourse using 17 U.S.C. § 501(c), which provides liability for 
secondary transmissions of copyrighted work.  However, because it applies to cable 
systems as opposed to Internet websites, it is likely that it does not apply.  Still, this might 
be an area for Zuffa to consider in formulating its argument, especially if the Internet 
websites are being accessed or transmitted via cable Internet services. 
 132 Pirates Beware!, supra note 117. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. 
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attempt to prove these assertions at trial to overcome the “financial 
benefit directly attributable to” the infringing content and the 
“right and ability to control” said content standards articulated in 
the DMCA, which, if overcome, would deny the website the 
statutory safe harbor protections.135  In its defense, Justin.TV is 
likely to rely heavily on the Viacom decision discussed above.136 
Both Justin.TV and UStream.TV, of course, claim compliance 
with the DMCA’s safe harbor requirements.137  Justin.TV, like 
YouTube, has in place a system whereby it bans repeat infringers 
and does not prohibit or impede copyright owners from policing 
infringement via standard technical measures such as routinely 
searching the site for videos with particular titles.138  Justin.TV 
also disclaims any responsibility for or profit from the videos 
posted,139 presumably to help it counter any claims of knowledge 
and control, which could cost it the protection the DMCA safe 
harbor.140 
UStream.TV similarly disclaims any control over the videos 
posted on its site,141 and, like Justin.TV, reserves the right to delete 
any and all videos without any prior notification.142  Like 
Justin.TV and YouTube, UStream.TV also provides information 
on its website about supplying notice to have UStream.TV take 
down any allegedly infringing video.143  UStream.TV also provides 
information about responding to and appealing the takedown.144 
It appears, then, that both Justin.TV and UStream.TV are 
compliant with the DMCA safe harbor provisions.  Therefore, 
 
 135 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (2006). 
 136 See supra Part II.B. 
 137 See Copyright Policy, USTREAM.TV, http://www.ustream.tv/copyright-policy (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2010); Digital Millennium Copyright Act Notification Guidelines, 
JUSTIN.TV, http://www.justin.tv/user/dmca (last visited Oct. 9, 2010).  
 138 Terms of Service ¶ 5, JUSTIN.TV, http://www.justin.tv/user/terms_of_service (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2009). 
 139 Id. ¶ 15. 
 140 For a discussion of the DMCA safe harbor requirements, see supra Part I.B. 
 141 Terms of Service, supra note 138, ¶ 5(c)(iii), USTREAM.TV, http://www.ustream.tv/ 
terms (last visited Oct. 12, 2010). 
 142 Id. ¶ 3(a). 
 143 See Copyright Policy, USTREAM.TV, http://www.ustream.tv/copyright-policy (last 
visited Oct. 12, 2010). 
 144 See id. (describing the procedure to file a counter notice). 
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unless Zuffa could prove that either (or both) website(s) actually 
knew about specific cases of infringement, Zuffa likely would 
neither be able to prove actual knowledge nor that the defendant 
websites had failed the “direct financial benefit test.”145 
Additionally, even if a video stream was titled UFC Pay-Per-
View, it would still be unlikely, under the Perfect 10 standard,146  
that Justin.TV or UStream.TV would be considered to have actual 
or constructive knowledge of infringing actions.  This is because 
some degree of investigation, whether it be clicking on the link and 
watching it, or seeing if the user had repeatedly uploaded streams 
that Zuffa had complained about in the past, would be necessary to 
determine whether any particular stream infringed Zuffa’s 
copyright.147  Indeed, the Perfect 10 standard provides a perverse 
incentive for Justin.TV and UStream.TV not to police their 
respective websites as carefully as they could, because if they 
investigated and attained actual knowledge of particular 
infringement, they would lose the benefit of the safe harbor 
provisions.  It pays, then, for Justin.TV and UStream.TV to remain 
as ignorant as possible as to what is being uploaded onto their 
respective websites and to argue that because some degree of 
inquiry would have been necessary to discover the infringing 
content, the infringement was not “apparent.”  Any investigation or 
increased knowledge of videos on the website would at least trend 
towards the site being liable for monetary and equitable relief. 
Even employing the “red flags” test might not create liability 
for Justin.TV or UStream.TV.  For example, if a hosted video 
stream were called Illegal UFC Stream or Banned UFC Stream, a 
court following Perfect 10 might believe that those adjectives 
simply add to the salaciousness of the streams.148  It is clear that 
mixed martial arts is not entirely accepted by mainstream 
 
 145 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A) (2006). 
 146 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007).  For discussion on this topic, see supra Part I.B. 
 147 See generally id. at 1114. 
 148 See, e.g., Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1114 (“When a website traffics in pictures that are 
titillating by nature, describing photographs as ‘illegal’ or ‘stolen’ may be an attempt to 
increase their salacious appeal, rather than an admission that the photographs are actually 
illegal or stolen.”). 
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society.149  The violent nature of the sport could, to observers not 
familiar with the sport, cause any court to believe that terms like 
“illegal” or “banned” might describe the event itself, rather than 
the stream.  Thus, even though Justin.TV and UStream.TV 
allegedly traffic heavily in and are major conduits for illegal and 
infringing content, Zuffa will almost certainly have a hard time 
proving constructive knowledge on the part of the defendants.  
Both sites are likely to be protected under the DMCA safe harbor.  
C. Current Litigation 
1. Gandu and Rage-Streams 
While UStream.TV, up to this point, has only been subpoenaed 
for user information, Zuffa has actually commenced litigation, at 
least in part under the DMCA, against a few sites that have 
allegedly streamed Zuffa’s pay-per-views without authorization.150  
One such site is Rage-Streams.net,151 a site appearing to be an 
“Internet forum.”152  Zuffa filed suit against Rage-Streams’ 
operator Moazzam Gandu in February 2010 for various violations 
of copyright law.153  For membership on this forum and access to 
the broadcasts, members pay a fee of $6.99.154  The forum hosts 
live streams of various videos, including UFC pay-per-views.155 
Zuffa asserts that Rage-Streams entices members to pay a fee 
in exchange for access to streaming video of UFC pay-per-
 
 149 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 150 See Steve Green, UFC Sues Web Site Operator Over Alleged Pirated Broadcasts, 
LAS VEGAS SUN (Feb. 19, 2010), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2010/feb/19/ufc-
sues-web-site-operator-over-alleged-pirated-br. 
 151 The website http://www.rage-streams.net has been taken down as of the writing of 
this Note. 
 152 See Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief at Ex. 2, Zuffa, LLC v. Gandu, 
No. 10 CV 00228 (D. Nev. Feb. 18, 2010), 2010 WL 739422 [hereinafter Zuffa-Gandu 
Complaint].  An “Internet forum” is a message board wherein people can have 
discussions about a variety of topics. See What Is an Internet Forum?, WISEGEEK, 
http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-an-internet-forum.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). 
 153 Steve Green, UFC Sues Web Site Operator over Alleged Pirated Broadcasts, LAS 
VEGAS SUN (Feb. 19, 2010), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2010/feb/19/ufc-sues-
web-site-operator-over-alleged-pirated-br. 
 154 See Zuffa-Gandu Complaint, supra note 152 ¶ 16. 
 155 See id.  
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views.156  Regardless of whether Gandu uploads the streams 
himself, Zuffa argues, he provides the capability on his website for 
others to do so, and profits via advertisements.157  Zuffa further 
asserts that Gandu either uploads the copyrighted broadcasts 
himself, or “knows or has reason to know, or has recklessly 
disregarded the fact that” Zuffa’s copyrights are being infringed on 
the website.158 
However, as Gandu may be protected from liability under the 
DMCA, Zuffa faces an interesting challenge.  For one, Zuffa 
asserts only that Gandu “knows or has reason to know or has 
recklessly disregarded” knowledge of the infringing videos.159  The 
DMCA, however, makes no mention of a “reckless disregard” for 
information.  In fact, the DMCA expressly states that access to the 
safe harbor will not be conditioned upon affirmatively seeking out 
information of infringement.160  Moreover, courts have interpreted 
the DMCA as saying that a website’s generalized knowledge of 
infringement does not qualify as actual or constructive knowledge 
of infringement, leaving that website protected under the safe 
harbor.161  If Zuffa cannot prove that Gandu had actual knowledge 
of infringement or that Gandu himself uploaded and streamed the 
videos,162 Zuffa would have to show that there were “red flags” of 
infringement163 and that Gandu failed to conduct an investigation 
on a specific link after it became apparent that the link was 
infringing and thus had constructive knowledge of infringement.164 
It would be difficult to prove that Gandu had notice of “red 
flags” (i.e., constructive knowledge) even if he “recklessly 
disregarded” information that, when researched, would have 
 
 156 See id. ¶¶ 19, 21–22. 
 157 See id. ¶¶ 19–20. 
 158 See id. ¶ 21. 
 159 Id.  
 160 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1) (2006).  
 161 See Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d. 514, 520–21 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010). 
 162 In the complaint, Zuffa alleged that Gandu may indeed have done this. See Zuffa-
Gandu Complaint, supra note 152. 
 163 See Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 520–21. 
 164 See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1108 
(C.D. Cal. 2009). 
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uncovered infringement.  Gandu could argue that on the forum his 
website hosted, he might have to first read the title of the thread,165 
click on the link to open the thread, read the message, click on the 
video to begin loading and then watch enough of the video to make 
sure it is actually an infringing use and not a fair use, which would 
be difficult for anyone but the content owner to do.  Therefore, a 
not insignificant amount of investigation would be required to 
determine whether any one particular video or stream was 
infringing.  Because of the amount of investigation required, 
Gandu would likely be able to satisfy the court that there were no 
“red flags” of infringement. 
A website is not protected under the safe harbor if it receives a 
direct financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing 
activity that the website has the right and ability to control.166  In 
this respect, the safe harbor contains a paradox of sorts.  At some 
level, a website must be able to delete or block access to infringing 
content to be protected under the safe harbor but must not receive a 
direct financial benefit from infringing items it controls.167  Courts 
and commentators have reasoned, then, that the “ability to control” 
standard is higher than the mere “ability to block or delete” a 
video.168  Various commentators and scholars have discussed this 
paradox.169 
Zuffa has a strong argument that Gandu directly benefits 
financially from the infringing content via ad revenue, as Viacom 
had argued that YouTube did in Viacom.170  On this argument, 
Gandu obtains a benefit by obtaining subscription fees to his forum 
using infringing material as bait.171  However, as the Viacom court 
ruled, the DMCA requires that one must know of the particular 
 
 165 A thread is each separate conversation within the forum itself. See What Is an 
Internet Forum?, supra note 152. 
 166 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (2006). 
 167 UMG Recordings, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1114. 
 168 Id.; see also Sawyer, supra note 57, at 375. 
 169 See, e.g., id.; Jane C. Ginsburg, Separating the Sony Sheep from the Grokster Goats: 
Reckoning the Future Business Plans of Copyright-Dependent Technology 
Entrepreneurs, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 577 (2008). 
 170 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 171 Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting A&M Records, 
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
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infringing activity to be benefiting from it.172  Gandu might be able 
to allege that he had no knowledge of particular acts of 
infringement, even with a generalized knowledge of ubiquitous 
infringement.  In Ellison v. Robertson,173 the Ninth Circuit held 
that a financial benefit exists when infringing content serves as “a 
draw” for customers.174  The Ellison court might have decided that 
Gandu received a direct financial benefit from infringing content 
because the infringing content was a draw to customers.  However, 
Zuffa still must prove that Gandu loses the safe harbor because 
Gandu also controls the content.175 
Gandu could claim that Rage-Streams’ videos are akin to 
YouTube’s videos, as he does not upload the material himself but 
merely retains the ability to delete or block the material, entitling 
him to safe harbor protection.  On this argument, Gandu would not 
lose safe harbor protection even if he had gained a direct financial 
benefit from infringing content because he did not control the 
content himself.176  For a website to lose protection under the safe 
harbor provision, more than just the ability to block and delete 
content is required, but this reveals another problem with the 
Perfect 10 and Viacom courts’ construction of the statute: if Gandu 
had a more intimate knowledge of the material so as to retain the 
right and ability to control access to the material and closely 
investigated the links on his website, he would be disqualified 
from the safe harbor anyway because he would have attained 
actual knowledge of infringement.177  Under the Perfect 10 court’s 
constructive knowledge standard, Gandu would be punished more 
for policing and not acting, as opposed to being punished for not 
policing his website at all.   
Moreover, the Viacom court’s finding that YouTube did not 
retain control over its content even though it retained the ability to 
 
 172 Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 173 357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 174 Id. at 1078 (quoting A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1023). 
 175 See Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 527; see also Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1078. 
176  See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (2006) (“A service provider shall not be liable for 
monetary relief . . . if the service provider . . . does not receive a financial benefit directly 
attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right 
and ability to control such activity . . . .”). 
 177 See Ginsburg, supra note 169, at 601. 
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block users and take down content renders the direct financial 
benefit prong redundant. The Viacom court’s reading of the 
“control” standard seems to make it equivalent to the statute’s 
“actual knowledge” standard.  If a website has the requisite 
“control” over content, the website also has “actual knowledge” of 
the content.  If the website has actual knowledge over content, the 
website loses the DMCA safe harbor anyway.  Either way, under 
the current regime, Gandu might escape liability (if only by the 
skin of his teeth) through the DMCA safe harbor. 
2. Current Litigation Success 
Zuffa has also filed suit against the owner and operator of two 
websites, livevss.net and livevss.tv, which both showed live 
streaming video of, amongst other television programs and 
sporting events, Zuffa’s pay-per-view events.178  The central 
allegation of the complaint is that these two websites derive 
revenue from the advertisements that pop up for the user while 
watching the live streams.179  In this case, Zuffa was able to obtain 
a temporary restraining order against livevss, preventing it from 
streaming UFC 120, a pay-per-view fight event.180  The temporary 
restraining order also demanded the domain hosts to take control of 
the websites and take them down.181  Unlike Justin.TV and 
UStream.TV, which purport to show people’s lives and what they 
 
 178 Justin Klein, Zuffa Files Lawsuit Seeking to Shut Down livevss.tv & livevss.net, 
FIGHT LAWYER (Oct. 11, 2010, 4:53 PM), http://www.fightlawyerblog.com/2010/10/ 
zuffa-files-lawsuit-seeking-to-shut.html. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Temporary Restraining Order and Order Setting Hearing on Preliminary Injunction, 
Zuffa, LLC v. Wallace, No. 2:10-CV-01756-KJD-LRL (D. Nev. Oct. 12, 2010) 
[hereinafter Temporary Restraining Order], available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/ 
federal/district-courts/nevada/nvdce/2:2010cv01756/76713/7.  Presumably, and quite 
interestingly, most of the benefit of this restraining order likely came, at least initially, 
from outside of the United States.  Most UFC events are in pay-per-view, but UFC 120 
aired for free on Spike in the United States though aired on pay-per-view in Australia. 
Compare UFC 120—How to Watch, UFC, http://www.ufc.com/event/ 
UFC120_london_event/watch (last visited Oct. 22, 2010), with UFC 120—How to 
Watch, UFC, http://au.ufc.com/ event/UFC120_london_event/watch (last visited Oct. 22, 
2010).  Note that the latter site is the Australian version of the UFC website. 
 181 See Temporary Restraining Order, supra note 180. 
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are doing, according to a profile, livevss conceded that it shows 
online TV, sports, news and entertainment.182 
Zuffa has successfully obtained a stipulated restraining order 
against another website, hq-streams.net.183  While effective, this 
could simply be a case of Zuffa flexing its legal muscle in an 
aggressive move to inform pirates of its monitoring.184  Zuffa, in 
acquiring said restraining orders, sent fear to websites who likely 
operate on a smaller budget than Zuffa, and could not practically 
afford to meet Zuffa in court. However, absent the temporary 
restraining orders, if one of these sites chose to see the litigation to 
its conclusion, it is not out of the realm of possibility that any one 
(or all) of them would qualify for protection under the wide-
reaching scope of the DMCA.  As discussed above, Gandu might 
be rendered safe under the DMCA safe harbor, and the 
aforementioned sites do not fall in an altogether different or unique 
category.  It is unclear, then, whether Zuffa’s suits against Gandu, 
Justin.TV, UStream.TV, livevss or any similar website would be 
successful under the DMCA if fully litigated.  If Zuffa cannot rely 
on the courts to provide a remedy, it might instead have to rely on 
takedown notices to effectuate its copyrights.185 
Zuffa has recently sent takedown notices to Google, asking it 
to remove from its search results certain websites that it knows 
frequently host and allow the viewing of illegal videos that are 
uploaded by “pirates.”186  These notices, calling for the removal of 
certain search results, were sent pursuant to a section of the DMCA 
relating to website archives and search engines that is separate 
 
 182 See Sites Like Livevss.tv, COMJUICE, http://similarsites.comjuice.com/browse/ 
related/sites-like/sm-livevss.tv-472856.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).  Justin.TV and 
UStream.TV purport to allow you to broadcast what you are doing. 
 183 See Justin Klein, Tike (hq-streams.com) Stipulate to Permanent Injunction in Zuffa 
Streaming Action, FIGHT LAWYER (Sept. 9, 2010, 1:35 PM), http://www. 
fightlawyerblog.com/2010/09/tike-and-hq-streamscom-stipulate-to.html (The two parties 
settled the matter with an agreement that Tike would enter into a “Stipulated Permanent 
Injunction.”). 
 184 See Jason Cruz, Zuffa Sues British PPV Pirate, MMA PAYOUT (Oct. 11, 2010), 
http://mmapayout.com/2010/10/zuffa-sues-british-ppv-pirate. 
 185 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (2006). 
 186 See Justin Klein, Zuffa Takes the Piracy Fight to Google, MMA PAYOUT (Nov. 19, 
2010), http://mmapayout.com/2010/11/zuffa-takes-the-piracy-fight-to-google [hereinafter 
Klein, Piracy Fight]. 
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from the notice-and-takedown requirements litigated in Viacom.187  
Under a separate provision of the DMCA, a website that provides 
“information location,” such as Google, is not liable for linking to 
websites containing infringing material as long as the site 
“expeditiously” takes down the link when informed of 
infringement.188 
Though not directly related to the issue of streaming video, the 
notices bear mentioning because the move backfired against 
Zuffa.189  While many of the links to pirate sites were taken off of 
Google’s search results, the websites themselves were not taken 
down.190  Worse, in making its demand, Zuffa inadvertently 
published a list of websites that host pirated videos, websites that 
were still active even if they were not posted on Google’s search 
results.191  Zuffa’s strategy of trying to choke off traffic to 
infringing websites has thus worked only to help the pirate 
websites achieve newfound recognition and draw more viewers.192   
III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Changes in Takedown Procedures and in the Knowledge 
Standard are Necessary for Streaming Video 
1. Takedown Notices are Insufficient 
The current takedown notice regime has been criticized 
recently193 with critics arguing that notice and takedown 
procedures have been widely abused.  As of 2009, Google reported 
that more than half of the takedown notices it had received since 
the enactment of the DMCA had been from copyright owners 
 
 187 See generally 17 U.S.C. § 512. 
 188 See id. § 512(d). 
 189 See Klein, Piracy Fight, supra note 186. 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. 
 193 See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 122 (2009); 
Andre Menko Bleech, Comment, What’s the Use? Good Faith Evaluations of ‘Fair Use’ 
and Digital Millennium Copyright Act ‘Takedown’ Notices, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 
241 (2009); Michael P. Murtagh, Note, The FCC, the DMCA, and Why Takedown 
Notices Are Not Enough, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 233 (2009). 
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targeting competitors; of those, nearly 40% of the claims were 
invalid.194  It has been suggested that the abuse of takedown 
notices is related to the fact that only substantial compliance with 
takedown notices is required.195  The DMCA contains a provision 
that establishes a penalty for any copyright owner who knowingly 
misrepresents any information concerning allegedly infringing 
material on its takedown notice.196  However, in the first ten years 
of the DMCA’s enactment that provision has been successfully 
enforced only once.197 
Some have criticized the DMCA’s takedown procedures for 
hurting legitimate end-users who are remixing materials, thus 
chilling a fair use.198  In a letter to the Library of Congress, the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation noted that large copyright owners 
send hundreds of thousands of takedown notices to service 
providers each month.199  Third party users who have their content 
removed are able to counter-notify to have their material put back 
up.200  However, this is rarely done.201 
At the same time, copyright owners must spend a considerable 
amount of time determining whether or not the material in question 
constitutes fair use.202  Unsurprisingly, most copyright owners 
believe any use is infringing, and not fair use.  Because most 
 
 194 See Ted Gibbons, Google Submission Hammers Section 92A, PC WORLD NEW 
ZEALAND (Mar. 16, 2009), http://pcworld.co.nz/pcworld/pcw.nsf/feature/ 
93FEDCEF6636CF90CC25757A0072B4B7. 
 195 See Bleech, supra note 193, at 254–56. 
 196 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2006). 
 197 Charles W. Hazelwood, Jr., Fair Use and the Takedown/Put Back Provisions of the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 50 IDEA 307, 325 (2010). 
 198 See Rebecca Tushnet, I Put You There: User-Generated Content and 
Anticircumvention, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 889, 919 (2010) (arguing that the true 
negative impact of the current regime is the inability of fair users to respond to takedown 
notices or infringement claims even when they have strong claims on the merits of fair 
use). 
 199 Letter from Fred von Lohmann & Jennifer S. Granick, Elec. Frontier Found., to U.S.  
Copyright Office, Library of Cong. 22 (Dec. 2, 2008), available at http://www.copyright. 
gov/1201/2008/comments/lohmann-fred.pdf.  
 200 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2). 
 201 See Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First 
Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986, 1014 (2008). 
 202 See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1154–55 (N.D. Cal. 
2008). 
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copyright owners believe any unauthorized use is infringing, a 
copyright owner is more likely to fire off massive amounts of 
takedown notices, and as a result takedown notices are subject to 
abuse.  As the Internet continues to grow and the amount of 
content and information on the Internet becomes more and more 
incalculable, there is an increased likelihood that work will be 
infringed upon on the Internet.203  Because copyright owners are 
given the onus to police the entire Internet for infringing work,204 
this task is becoming increasingly onerous. 
Though copyright owners are faced with an incredibly arduous 
task to protect their works, they still are criticized for casting too 
wide a net. Viacom was criticized for sending hundreds of 
thousands of notices to YouTube, many of which were improper, 
as many of the videos targeted did not, in fact, infringe Viacom’s 
copyrights.205  However, those who criticize the numerosity of 
takedown notices largely fail to consider the enormity of the task at 
hand.  Even one court has admitted that saddling the copyright 
owners with the exclusive responsibility of forever policing 
websites in search of infringing content violates the spirit of the 
DMCA.206 
However, at least in Viacom, the court squarely places the 
burden to police the Internet on the content owner, reasoning that a 
website’s infringing works may represent only a small fraction of 
the total works on the website.207  The Viacom court pointed out 
that over twenty-four hours of video was posted on YouTube every 
minute.208  The court does not seem to consider (and neither do 
some like-minded critics) that the burden is too onerous on 
copyright holders, especially those copyright holders for whom 
time is of the essence in protecting their rights.  Why is the burden 
too onerous for a service provider to police its own website, when 
 
 203 See Bleech, supra note 193, at 260–61. 
 204 See Jansen, supra note 58, at 172–73. 
 205 Fred von Lohman, Unfairly Caught in Viacom’s Dragnet? Let Us Know!, ELEC. 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 8, 2007), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2007/02/unfairly-caught-
viacoms-dragnet-let-us-know. 
 206 Hendrickson v. Amazon.com, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 2d 914, 917 (C.D. Cal. 2003).  
 207 Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 523–24. 
 208 Id. at 518. 
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only a fraction of the work posted may be infringing, but the 
burden is not too onerous for a content owner to hunt for that same 
potentially tiny fraction?  The very reason that websites are 
inundated with incredible amounts of takedown notices is almost 
undoubtedly because copyright owners are forced to police the 
entire Internet and are thus crunched for time to protect their 
copyrights.  It is wholly unclear that placing the burden on 
copyright owners to scour the vast reaches of the Internet for 
infringement is sound policy. 
The purpose of copyright law is to promote the advancement of 
science and art by providing protection for original works of 
authorship.209  However, current readings of the DMCA do not 
foster this goal or policy.  An author with creative works is faced 
with significant barriers to create works of art.  Rather than 
fostering the advancement of science and art, the DMCA’s 
regulatory scheme might actually be hindering it.  A content 
owner, on top of working to create an original work of authorship, 
is, under the DMCA, faced with the burden of policing the Internet 
to see that its work is not infringed.  This forced expenditure of 
time, money and effort to protect content on the Internet poses a 
significant disincentive to create new and interesting works. 
The Viacom court appeared to appreciate the enormity of the 
task for website owners to police their own websites for infringing 
material, but did not appreciate the content owners’ burden in 
policing that same amount of material for their own works.  It 
remains unclear how the current regime reflects a “balance” at all 
between copyright owners and website service providers.  The 
argument that the onus to police the Internet would be too heavy 
on website service providers, but not too heavy on content owners 
is ultimately shortsighted. 
2. The Unique Position of Pay-Per-View 
The onus to police the Internet is amplified in the context of 
live streaming of pay-per-view content.  While receipt of a 
takedown notice forces the service provider to take down or block 
 
209  See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991) (citing 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
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access to the infringing video “expeditiously,”210 no court has yet 
held a service provider liable for failure to take down content 
expeditiously.211  In fact, the Viacom court seemed satisfied that 
almost all of the takedown notices were acted upon by the next 
business day.212 
Zuffa, and other companies reliant on the pay-per-view 
industry, do not have that kind of time.  Every second that a stream 
is live and being watched is of absolutely critical importance.  UFC 
President Dana White is correct in stating, “All this [pay-per-view 
piracy] stuff is brand new . . . . When our event gets stolen, it’s 
dead.  It’s over.  You know the results.  A live event is different 
than anything else.”213  Zuffa thus has a maximum of three hours— 
the average length of one of its pay-per-views214—to issue 
takedown notices.  After the notice is issued, Zuffa is forced to 
wait and hope the service provider takes down or blocks access 
almost immediately.  If Zuffa wants to recapture any piece of the 
market that would normally pay the full price for the event, it must 
be almost instantaneous on the draw; every minute that passes 
makes it less likely that someone will pay full price for a smaller 
and smaller fraction of an event.  Thus, the DMCA, as it currently 
stands and as it is currently interpreted, cannot successfully defend 
pay-per-view and other live events against Internet piracy. 
Zuffa’s chances at being paid for its live content are 
immeasurably injured by the DMCA’s notice-and-takedown 
requirements.  If Zuffa, or any content owner producing a pay-per-
view, is unable to discover a stream in progress within three hours, 
then its search is ultimately meaningless—the event is over and the 
issuance of any takedown notice is pointless.  However, Zuffa 
must do considerably more than that.  Even if Zuffa discovers the 
stream, to successfully recover even some of its profits, it must 
 
 210 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) (2006). 
 211 Debra Weinstein, Note, Defining Expeditious: Uncharted Territory of the DMCA 
Safe Harbor Provision—A Survey of What We Know and Do Not Know About The 
Expeditiousness of Service Provider Responses to Takedown Notifications, 26 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 589, 603–04 (2008). 
 212 Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 524. 
 213 See Morgan, supra note 43. 
 214 See UFC, IN DEMAND, http://www.indemand.com/events/ufc (last visited Oct. 22, 
2010). 
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draft and send a compliant takedown notice, and the recipient of 
the notice must actually take down the content, all within the three-
hour window.  Moreover, the ambiguous term “expeditiously” 
does not indicate whether takedown of the infringing stream, even 
a day later, would comply with the statute (although Viacom 
suggests that it almost certainly would).  Worse, the current trend 
of deference to website owners for any delay in providing 
appropriate remedies has been pervasive among courts across the 
country.   
For example, in UMG Recordings, Inc., v. Veoh Networks, 
Inc.,215 defendant Veoh, a video hosting site like YouTube,  
delayed nine months in applying a fingerprinting technology in 
order to better track infringing works on its site.216  This meant, of 
course, that potentially infringing videos sat on the Internet for 
over nine months, where they could be viewed for free.  The court 
held that Veoh was under no affirmative duty to implement any 
sort of technological measure, so its failure to implement any such 
measure within any particular amount of time did not show a lack 
of good faith.217 
Extrapolating these holdings to Zuffa’s situation would likely 
mean that a website like Justin.TV, UStream or any number of 
similar websites that at least on occasion host illegal streams of 
pay-per-view events could wait nearly a year, and perhaps through 
nearly a dozen pay-per-view events, to implement technology to 
detect infringement without waiving statutory immunity for 
infringement liability.  While the courts have seemed satisfied with 
the “expeditious” removal in Viacom and other cases, the day or 
two it took YouTube to take down videos would prove disastrous 
for Zuffa.  Because of the nature of live pay-per-view, waiting 
even an hour to remove or block a video would be devastating to 
Zuffa; a day would be catastrophic.   
 
 215 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099.  
 216 Id. at 1111. 
 217 Id. at 1111–12. 
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3. The Knowledge Standard as Articulated by Courts is Too 
Onerous 
The DMCA provides that if a service provider is aware of 
information that makes infringement apparent, that service 
provider will not be protected under the safe harbor, unless upon 
gathering such information he or she acts expeditiously to remove 
infringing material.218  In practice, however, courts have stated that 
this “red flag” test means that if any investigation into the content 
is required on the part of the service provider to discover whether 
or not the content infringes, then the service provider does not 
forfeit the safe harbor.219 
 In so holding, courts collapsed the “actual knowledge” 
standard into the “red flag” test, in essence creating one stringent 
standard for knowledge, as opposed to the two separate standards.  
It could not have been Congress’s intent to create two separate 
clauses that in effect operate the same way.220  Congress, when 
discussing the passage of the DMCA, discussed the “actual 
knowledge” and the “red flags” standards in wholly separate 
sections of the DMCA.221  In fact, Congress stated that the 
subjective knowledge of the service provider should be taken into 
account in conducting the red flag test.222  Later, Congress stated in 
both the House and Senate Committee’s advisory notes that “once 
a service provider obtains actual knowledge or awareness of facts 
or circumstances from which infringing material or activity on the 
service provider’s system or network is apparent,” the service 
provider must take down the material.223  However, as construed 
by the courts, it is unclear how the red flag test, in practice, 
 
 218 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii)–(iii) (2006).  
 219 See UMG Recordings, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1108.  
220  The Supreme Court has previously cautioned against reading text in a way that 
makes part of it redundant. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 551 U.S. 664, 669 (2007) (“[W]e have cautioned against reading a text in a way 
that makes part of it redundant.”); TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“We are 
reluctant to treat statutory terms as surplusage in any setting.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 221 See Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 520–21 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, at 44–45 (1998); S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 53–54 
(1998)). 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. (emphasis added). 
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operates in any substantively different way than the actual 
knowledge standard.   
Furthermore, it is illogical to argue that when a website like 
Justin.TV or UStream.TV receives multiple takedown notices for 
the same content, the sites have not been placed “on notice” simply 
because some level investigation is required to determine if the 
claims are true.  Yet, the Viacom court seemed to hold that unless 
the service provider has specific knowledge of a particular case of 
infringement, generalized knowledge of infringement will not cost 
it the safe harbor protection.224  This interpretation has been 
criticized previously, and many commentators have argued that 
once a service provider becomes aware of a specific instance of 
infringement, it should no longer be protected for failure to take 
down the infringing content.225  In fact, two French courts have 
already held that an initial takedown notice effectively put Google 
on notice for future infringements of the same video.226 
Considering that the DMCA was passed over a decade ago, and 
the evolving technology in this day and age, the time has come for 
Congress to reassess the functionality of the DMCA and assess 
how copyright owners and website owners should interact with one 
another to better enforce copyright protection.227  Since just before 
the passage of the DMCA, the percentage of people worldwide 
using the Internet has increased twelve-fold.228  Congress, when 
writing and passing the law, could not have comprehended a world 
like today’s where website owners have made a profitable business 
 
 224 Id. at 525. 
 225 See Jansen, supra note 58, at 179–80. 
 226 See Ginsburg, supra note 169, at 606–08 (citing Zadig Productions et autres / 
Google Inc, Afa, Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original 
jurisdiction] Paris, 3e ch., 2e sec., Oct. 19, 2007 (Fr.) available at 
http://www.legalis.net/jurisprudence-decision.php3?id_article=2072). 
 227 Alan L. Friel & Nathan D. Meyer, Friel and Meyer on User-Generated Content: 
Potential DMCA Safe Harbor, LEXISNEXIS (Apr. 16, 2008 6:18 PM), 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/community/copyright-trademarklaw/blogs/ 
copyrightandtrademarkcommentary/archive/2008/04/16/friel-and-meyer-on-
user_2d00_generated-content-in-the-web-2.0-era_3a00_-the-potential-dmca-safe-
harbor.aspx.  
 228 See Bleech, supra note 193, at 260. 
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through skating by and around the DMCA.229  It has even been 
suggested that some websites now deliberately upload and offer 
infringing content to boost their traffic, but finding proof of such 
conduct is prohibitively difficult.230  A reassessment of copyright 
protection in light of the relatively recent ability to stream live 
television over the Internet is a necessary step to effectuate fair 
protection of content owners. 
4. New Legislation—How the Current Proposed Legislation is 
Inadequate 
It appears that some members of Congress have at least tacitly 
acknowledged the DMCA’s failure to target sites that are set up 
almost exclusively to infringe copyright.  On September 20, 2010, 
an amendment to the Combating Online Infringement and 
Counterfeits Act (“COICA”) was introduced in Congress.231  This 
amendment attempted to close the gap left by the DMCA some 
twelve years ago.232 
COICA would require the Attorney General to receive 
information from the public—including content owners—about 
sites that are dedicated to committing infringement and to provide 
content owners information about informing the Department of 
Justice of these sites.233  Under the proposed Act, the Attorney 
General would be able to ask for a temporary restraining order or 
injunction to prevent any further infringement.234  The Attorney 
General would also be empowered to bring an in rem action 
against such websites.235 
Interestingly, COICA covers both domestic and international 
websites236 and would permit the Attorney General to commence 
 
 229 Mathew D., Gaming the DMCA Safe Harbor Law for Profit, GLOBAL OUTPOST 
(June 24, 2010, 4:04 PM), http://www.theglobaloutpost.com/archives/43. 
 230 Id. 
 231 See Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act, S. 3804, 111th Congress 
(2010) [hereinafter COICA]. 
 232 See generally id. 
 233 Id. Sec. 3(1).  
 234 Id. Sec. 2 § 2324(b). 
 235 Id. Sec. 2 § 2324(c)(1). 
 236 See id. Sec. 2 § 2324(d)(2).  It should also be noted that several world powers have 
come together to create the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (“ACTA”), which 
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in rem proceedings against a foreign website, so long as the 
website is accessible in the United States, conducts business with 
residents of the United States and infringes the copyrights of 
residents of the United States.237  COICA even provides criteria to 
determine whether a site is conducting business directed at 
residents of the United States.238 
However, issues arise when COICA attempts to define which 
websites are actually covered under this proposed legislation.  A 
website is dedicated to infringing activities if it is “primarily 
designed, has no demonstrable, commercially significant purpose 
or use other than, or is marketed by its operator, or by a person 
acting in concert with the operator” to infringe.239  Additionally, 
even if a site is not primarily designed with the purposes of 
infringement, if infringement is “central to the activity” of the 
website, the site will also be covered.240 
This proposed legislation has met with some criticism from 
Internet engineers; more than ninety Internet engineers have 
banded together to urge the Senate to reject this bill.241  They 
allege that COICA would create tremendous fear in the Internet 
community,242 dampening technological innovation.243  
Interestingly, this sentiment echoes the very concerns articulated 
 
would encourage Internet service providers to cooperate with content owners to remove 
infringing material.  While the agreement has not been made public, it has been the 
subject of much debate.  International comity would be helpful in providing COICA with 
jurisdiction over international websites, and would also help to create a system by which 
website owners would communicate with content owners worldwide to help impede 
infringement.  However, because the precise text of the act is still secret, it would be 
imprudent to refer to and criticize it at this time.  For more information on ACTA as it 
operates globally, see What is ACTA?, ACTA, http://acta.net.nz. (last visited Mar. 25, 
2011). 
 237 See id. Sec. 2 § 2324(d)(2)(B). 
 238 See id.  
 239 Id. Sec. 2 § 2324(a)(2)(A). 
 240 Id. § 2324(a)(2)(B).  This result appears to be a codification of the holding in MGM 
Studios v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
 241 See Peter Eckersley, An Open Letter from Internet Engineers to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 28, 2010), http://www.eff.org/ 
deeplinks/2010/09/open-letter. 
 242 Id. 
 243 Id.  
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by Congress when passing the DMCA in 1998.244  Similarly, 
several law professors have also opposed COICA245 arguing that 
there are “egregious Constitutional infirmities in the act.”246  These 
professors contend that COICA will abridge free speech on the 
Internet and would also frequently and improperly target Internet 
providers247 instead of the operators of the infringing websites 
themselves.248   
Worse, it is not readily apparent that COICA will do anything 
to truly help content owners who stream their content over the 
Internet.  Zuffa, for one, has already been able to obtain 
preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders against 
websites streaming their work under the existing copyright 
regime.249  Moreover, Justin.TV, UStream.TV and some of the 
more popular “pirate” websites still might be safe under COICA.  
Justin.TV and UStream.TV both hold themselves out as Internet 
communities of webcam users who are broadcasting what they are 
doing live.250  It may be difficult, then, to argue that infringement 
is Justin.TV or UStream.TV’s primary reason for operating.251  
Additionally, it may be difficult to prove that either website has no 
discernible “commercially significant purpose” since the sites’ 
stated purpose ostensibly has nothing to do with any pre-existing 
content, let alone infringement.  Rather both sites’ “commercially 
significant purpose” is just to provide a website on which people 
can broadcast their lives. 
It is also unclear how the “central to the activity” standard 
would apply to Justin.TV or UStream.TV, if at all.  If the 
 
 244 Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(quoting S. Rep. No. 105-190 (1998)). 
 245 See Letter from Temple Law School Law Professors in Opposition to S. 3804 
(Combating Online Infringements and Counterfeits Act) (Nov. 16, 2010), available at 
http://www.temple.edu/lawschool/dpost/COICAFull.doc. 
 246 Id. 
247  The distinction is subtle.  An Internet service provider, in this context, is a company 
that provides access to the Internet, as opposed to a service provider in the context of the 
DMCA, which is a website that provides a service on the Internet. See ISP, WEBOPEDIA, 
http://www.webopedia.com/term/i/ISP.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2011). 
 248 Id. 
 249 See supra Part II.C.2. 
 250 See supra notes 115–16. 
 251 See COICA, supra note 231, § 2324(a)(1). 
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application and interpretation of the DMCA’s “red flag” test is any 
indication252 it is likely that the “central” test will be applied quite 
stringently.  This would likely mean that if a website can prove or 
even argue that infringement is not the site’s primary purpose, and 
that most of the site’s uploads are not infringing, Justin.TV and 
UStream.TV might be able to get away unscathed by COICA, at 
least as currently drafted. 
Moreover, the Viacom decision likely would have come out the 
same way even if COICA were in place at the time it was decided.  
In Viacom, the court read the word “expeditiously” heavily in 
favor of YouTube,253 holding that YouTube’s removal of almost 
all of the videos at issue from its site within one business day 
qualified as “expeditious” under the statute.254  This holding looks 
to achieve Congress’s stated goal of fostering the growth of the 
Internet, with which courts readily have fallen in line, while 
ignoring Congress’s other stated goal of continuing to protect 
copyright.  This interpretation of the word “expeditious” is too 
broad, at least in the context of pay-per-view, and there is no 
reason to assume courts would read COICA any differently.  The 
Viacom court likely would still seek to protect service providers, 
and, in turn, the growth and expansion of the Internet.  Were the 
court to have read COICA, it is likely that the word “central” 
would have been read similarly.  Several courts, from the Veoh 
decisions up through Viacom have sided with service providers 
over content owners. 
This judicial favor can also be identified in the equally broad 
reading of the “red flag” test.255  In interpreting the DMCA, courts 
have created a heavy burden for copyright owners, and in the 
process, have even run counter to the intent of Congress.256  Were 
the courts to show similar deference to service providers in 
construing COICA, terms such as “central” and “primary” would 
likely be read in favor of service providers.  Courts have 
essentially collapsed the “red flag” standard into the actual 
 
 252 See supra Part II.A. 
 253 See Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 254 Id. 
 255 See supra Part I.B.1. 
 256 See supra Part I.B.1. 
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knowledge standard,257 creating an enormous barrier for copyright 
owners to achieve protection.  Were the vague terms of COICA to 
be interpreted by the same courts in similar cases, COICA might 
well be interpreted similarly to place its remedies beyond the reach 
of most copyright owners. 
Third, COICA does not address the most pressing need for the 
owners of copyright in live streaming video: the absolutely critical 
nature of time.258  As noted above, Zuffa has very little time to 
scour the Internet, find infringing content, consider fair use and 
issue a takedown notice.  Nevertheless, its revenue model depends 
upon content whose value, while high, is fleeting and completely 
reliant on its being live and in the moment.  Legislation like the 
DMCA and COICA simply does not address copyright protection 
in the context of live, streaming content.  Indeed, even if a court 
were to read the word “expeditiously” in the DMCA as requiring 
any particular website to take down a video within seconds, Zuffa 
would still have to scour the Internet and prepare compliant 
takedown notices, using up time it does not have. 
This Note additionally proposes an approach for protecting 
copyright in live streaming content without chilling protected 
speech on the Internet. 
5. Recommendation of Increased Interaction Between 
Websites and Content Owners Through the Copyright 
Office 
Even courts that have liberally construed the DMCA safe 
harbor have recognized the tremendous burden on content owners 
to police the Internet.259  While content owners do possess unique 
knowledge of what their content actually is, and are in a better 
position to assess infringement and, to a lesser extent, fair use,260 
websites too possess critical knowledge: what is being uploaded, 
by whom, and when. 
 
 257 See supra Part III.A.3. 
 258 See generally COICA, supra note 231. 
 259 Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
 260 See Jansen, supra note 58, at 172–73. 
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Professor Jane Ginsburg,261 in assessing difficulties courts have 
had in interpreting the DMCA, believes that eventually courts will 
parse out “good” infringers from “bad.”262  In fact, COICA seems 
to echo Ginsburg’s sentiments that a site must be economically 
viable without infringement in order to qualify for statutory 
protection.263  Ginsburg also believes that the “red flag” standard 
articulated in the DMCA should be changed from requiring 
“apparent” infringement to “reasonably anticipatable” 
infringement, which could occur after as little as one notice of 
infringement.264 
Some technological measures, such as video fingerprinting, 
may be of some assistance.265  However, as noted earlier, an 
assessment of fair use necessarily requires a human, non-
automated review process.266  Critics of the DMCA and COICA 
rightly point out that automatic rejection using automated systems 
of assessment could chill many fair uses of copyrighted content.267  
Were fair use videos automatically rejected and taken off the 
Internet, it stands to reason that fewer videos that make fair use of 
copyrighted content would be made at all, because there is 
diminished incentive to create when nobody can see or enjoy the 
work. 
Thus, the balance here is actually more complicated than 
Congress initially anticipated.  First, the courts and the legislature 
must balance the interests of copyright owners with website 
service providers, as provided in the DMCA.  However, we must 
also attempt to balance both of those parties’ interests against fair 
uses by third parties.  A rebalancing of the interests of all three of 
these parties is called for, particularly in the highly time-sensitive 
context of copyright in streaming video. 
 
 261 Jane C. Ginsburg, COLUMBIA L. SCH., http://www.law.columbia.edu/fac/ 
Jane_Ginsburg (last visited Mar. 19, 2011). 
 262 See generally Ginsburg, supra note 169. 
 263 See id. at 602. 
 264 Id. at 608.  Ginbsurg is not alone in this belief. See, e.g., Jansen, supra note 58, at 
179–80. 
 265 See generally Sawyer, supra note 57. 
 266 Id. at 388–90. 
 267 Jansen, supra note 58, at 176. 
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In reimagining how the DMCA should operate in order to 
avoid abuse by copyright owners, Congress should change the 
DMCA to provide that takedown notices pass through the 
Copyright Office as opposed to going directly to website service 
providers, as they do now.268  Admittedly, this would take more 
time, and require an additional expenditure of resources.269  
However, due to the nature of the Internet, and how pervasive it is 
in society, the costs of policing the Internet to protect copyright 
must be taken into account by the government as a cost of 
effectively protecting copyright in the Internet age.270  
The United States Copyright Office could oversee takedown 
notices by requiring them to be filed in a national registry.  “Good 
infringers” (or “Sony Sheep” as Ginsburg refers to them271), could 
come forward to the Copyright Office as owners of websites that 
truly wish to eliminate infringement from the sites.  These websites 
would acknowledge, upon registration, that they believe that 
streaming, live (or slightly delayed), infringing content is 
available, or will likely be made available on their websites 
because of the nature of the legitimate service they provide.  
Registration would provide a rebuttable presumption of non-
infringement freeing them from the bounds of the DMCA, which 
provides disincentives for policing their own sites.272  By contrast, 
a website that does not register would remain subject to regular 
takedown notice procedure.  If repeatedly found to be hosting 
infringing live videos, the site will be denied safe harbor 
protection, subjecting it to vicarious and contributory infringement 
liability.273 
 
 268 Jeffrey Cobia, Note, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act Takedown Notice 
Procedure: Misuses, Abuses, and Shortcomings of the Process, 10 MINN. J. L. SCI. & 
TECH. 387, 404 (2009). 
 269 Id. at 405. 
 270 Id. 
271  See Ginsburg, supra note 169, at 587. 
 272 See Erick Schoenfeld, Justin.TV Turns to Law Professor Eric Goldman as it Battles 
Live Video Piracy, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 15, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/03/15/ 
justin-tv-eric-goldman-copyright. 
 273 Vicarious liability occurs when a defendant has the right and ability to control 
infringing conduct and has a direct financial interest in the infringement.  Interestingly, 
there is no knowledge requirement.  The defendant does not have to know that another 
actor is infringing.  Contributory infringement takes two forms: (1) personal conduct 
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On the other side, content owners who believe that their 
material will be infringed may likewise register.  These owners 
may be able to manifest a belief that their content has, in the past, 
been infringed on live streaming websites.  Before their content 
went up live on television or pay-per-view, content owners would 
submit a modified form of a current takedown notice including the 
title of the content, a description of the content, and the times 
during which such content will air in each respective market.  This 
information would be forwarded to the websites, and the law 
would impose a duty to monitor the website for the specified 
content upon website owners. 
As argued above, the DMCA’s “red flag” standard is too high.  
At the very least, in the context of streaming video, the “red flag” 
standard should be lowered to “reasonable anticipation,” as 
Professor Ginsburg suggests.274  Providing video hosting sites with 
information about what pay-per-view or other live events might be 
pirated and when the live event will be aired would create 
“reasonable anticipation” for websites.  When a suspicious stream 
is uploaded, the website, having been placed on notice of a 
simultaneous copyrighted broadcast with the same or similar name, 
would have to send a link to the video in question to the Copyright 
Office.  The website would also temporarily disable access to the 
video, to prevent economic harm to the copyright holder and 
inform the uploader that his video has been flagged.  Meanwhile, 
the content owner would provide the actual content to the 
Copyright Office.  The Copyright Office could then compare the 
two, live and as they occur, to see if the video in question is a fair 
use or an infringement.  If found to be the latter, the Copyright 
Office would order an immediate takedown.  While this may not 
catch all infringing videos—for example, because titles could be 
misleading or intentionally misspelled—it will get rid of the most 
popular and obvious ones.  Of course, if a content owner sees 
repeated alternate spellings of its content over time, it could add 
these popular misspellings to its initial notice to the websites. 
 
furthering infringement or (2) contribution of means to infringe.  For a more detailed 
discussion on these two types of infringement, see 3-12 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID 
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04 (Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2010). 
274  See Ginsburg, supra note 169. 
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The above proposal prevents abuse on all sides.  ISPs are 
protected, copyright owners are protected, and websites, once 
registered, are protected from liability for videos over which they 
exercise no control.  The Copyright Office plays a crucial role as a 
neutral arbiter under this system.  Its participation is needed to 
prevent overreach by copyright owners who might otherwise be 
eager to quash anything critical of or in competition with their own 
products.  Indeed, critics of the DMCA’s notice-and-takedown 
regime argue that takedown notices are so misused now, resulting 
in massive abuse of the system.275 
Additionally, the proposed system saves vital seconds, minutes 
and hours in the fight against piracy of live events.  The proposed 
framework permits websites to quickly—indeed, preemptively—
target infringing works and flag them for the Copyright Office.  
The Copyright Office can then swiftly assess whether the content 
at issue infringes and order it taken down immediately, if 
necessary.  No longer would the content owner have to scour the 
vast reaches of the Internet to discover infringement.  No longer 
would it have to prepare takedown notices, assess fair use and pray 
that the notice is received and acted upon in time. 
Of course, this system does require a significant investment of 
resources to pay for employees, equipment and the like.  The 
proposed system would likely not be cost prohibitive, however, if 
both sides were required to pay to be involved in the system.  Upon 
registration, website owners would pay a fee per video uploaded to 
stream on their websites, just as producers of CD burners pay a 
nominal fee per burner produced,276 and as has been suggested for 
production of digital video recorders.277  Additionally, content 
owners would also pay into the system per copyright they seek to 
protect.  Of course, this would create barriers to entry into the 
registry, but would also provide both the content owner and the 
website service provider with incredibly beneficial results.  
Copyright owners would receive increased protection for their 
content with greatly reduced enforcement costs.  Service providers 
 
 275 See Tushnet, supra note 201, at 1003. 
276  See 17 U.S.C. § 1004 (2006). 
 277 See Justin M. Jacobson, Note, Cablevision Remote DV-R and a Solution for a 
Digital Recording Age, TOURO L. REV. (Forthcoming 2011). 
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would enjoy reduced exposure to vicarious infringement liability, 
and a strong presumption of non-infringement in the event of 
litigation.  Of course, there must be some high-level cost-benefit 
analysis in order to establish the proper outcome.  However, the ad 
revenue from the websites themselves should cover almost all of 
the cost.  At a minimum, Congress should recognize that Internet 
copyright issues are only going to increase in number and 
complexity in the future, increasing the urgency of developing a 
robust copyright protection regime for streaming video sooner than 
later. 
Paying in also provides an additional benefit.  If a website is 
set up exclusively to infringe via live streaming, it will face 
additional pressures whether or not it registers.  Registered pirates 
(assuming there are any) will presumably post very few videos 
under this new regime, as each posting would be immediately 
removed.  This would decrease website traffic, as the site would be 
essentially empty.  As ad revenues dried up with the sites’ traffic, 
websites that exist solely to infringe would be driven out of 
business.  If a streaming site whose primary purpose is 
infringement elects not to register, if it is found to be a repeat 
offender, it will forfeit DMCA safe harbor protection and become 
liable for vicarious and contributory infringement.  The proposed 
system thus makes it unprofitable to be a website that is set up 
exclusively to infringe.  This would help to curb at least streaming 
video piracy. 
B. Editing COICA 
With regard to piracy generally, if COICA is to be passed, 
several changes in wording should be made.  Potentially 
ambiguous terms should be clearly defined so as to prevent courts 
from construing them too heavily in favor of websites (as this Note 
argues they have done with respect to the DMCA).  Congress 
should provide unmistakably firm definitions of the terms “central” 
and “primary” in the statute.  Perhaps a percentage-based 
formulation is necessary; sites whose total number of works 
includes a high percentage of infringing works are those for which 
infringement is “central” to the activity of the website.  One could 
also measure how many traffickers watch infringing works through 
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the website as compared to works that are legitimate.  One way or 
another, a more exact definition of “central” and “primary” should 
be required before passage so as to cover the most pervasive 
infringers.  Were Congress to leave nebulous wording in place, it is 
not unlikely, based largely upon the considerations at work in the 
Viacom ruling, that courts would interpret COICA to be more 
protective of websites than originally intended. 
Congress could also impose a “repeat infringer” test in COICA.  
Essentially, Congress could provide for contributory and vicarious 
infringement liability for websites that have shown a tendency to 
react more slowly to takedown notices or which have consistently 
been the targets of legitimate takedown notices but which fail to 
police infringement on their sites.  A website that shows a 
tendency to repeatedly host infringing videos will be forced to 
police its own site or to face vicarious or contributory copyright 
liability.  This test would be similar to the percentage test 
described above, as some level of defined frequency of 
infringement would be necessary.  Allowing the courts to 
essentially dictate and define the statute’s terms would result in 
unanticipated and dangerous windfalls for service providers as it 
has with the DMCA. 
C. An Alternative Take—Giving the Power of the Websites to 
Copyright Owners 
Justin.TV and UStream.TV claim to be DMCA-compliant 
websites.278  In order for a website to comply with the DMCA, a 
website must retain the ability to block access to or remove 
infringing content.279  It must be true, then, that Justin.TV and 
UStream.TV are able to block access to or remove certain videos 
from their respective websites.  Congress could create a system 
where sites that host live streaming video content could grant 
limited access to these blocking mechanisms to the copyright 
holders themselves. 
Every copyright holder could sign up as the valid owner of live 
content, with a unique identification number (perhaps even one 
 
 278 See Part II.B. 
 279 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006). 
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that changes daily).  Content owners could then go to the websites 
and immediately, but temporarily, sign in to block allegedly 
infringing content themselves.  The block could last for an hour, 
three hours, or however long is determined to be adequate by the 
parties.  Those who have their streams blocked by content 
providers would have the ability to appeal the block, and recover 
for any damages if the block was later found to quash a fair use.  
To prevent abuse of the system by content providers, frequent 
abuses of the system (such as blocking competitors’ content or 
content in which the “provider” does not, in fact, hold a copyright) 
would be temporarily or permanently banned from using the 
system, on top of being liable for damages (and possibly 
heightened statutory damages for intentional abuse of the system). 
Such a system would allow for the immediacy that live content 
requires in order to be successfully protected.  The mechanisms for 
blocking and taking down infringing content are already in place, 
as the DMCA requires.  Giving content owners the ability to use 
these blocking and takedown systems quickly will help to curb 
rampant pay-per-view and live television piracy.  In creating this 
“shared blocking ability” system and providing incentives to use 
the system properly, Congress would create a workable copyright 
protection regime for live television streaming on the Internet. 
CONCLUSION 
Zuffa LLC and the UFC, as pay-per-view-driven companies, 
face enormous threats to the sanctity of their copyrights in the 
Internet era.  While UFC President Dana White has embraced the 
Internet, he has also encountered in it a formidable foe.  The 
DMCA and the courts interpreting it have done little to provide 
relief to content owners.  This twelve-year-old legislation has 
proven archaic and needs an overhaul.  The time has come for 
Congress to reassess how copyright owners and Internet service 
providers interact in light of new technologies.  In the context of 
unauthorized live video streaming, time is of the utmost 
importance in stopping infringement.  Creating a dialogue between 
content owners and ISPs through a third-party intermediary will 
help to provide needed relief to content owners more swiftly and 
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less onerously than the current regime permits.  This will help 
separate those websites meant to infringe from those that 
unwittingly infringe as a function of the service they provide.  It 
will give content owners who rely on pay-per-view revenues and 
viewership of their live product a much more thorough degree of 
protection and will enable content creators like Zuffa to keep the 
hits coming. 
